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ARGUMENT 
For purposes of this argument, the Appellants will be referred to as the Dunns and the 
Appellees will be referred to as the Prichards. 
I THE SELLERS, INCLUDING THE PRICHARDS, AND THE BUYERS [THE 
DUNNS] DID INTEND THE DOCUMENT TO BE BINDING UPON THEM. 
In Prichards' Brief, the fourth sentence of paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, which 
states, "The date for delivery of possession was left blank because no transfer of possession or 
actual sale under this document was contemplated," is argumentative and not within the record 
cited. On the contrary, Wanda Jean Kump, the other joint owner with the Prichards, stated, "all 
this paper meant to me was if we signed, we signed to let the bank know that we would sell it 
to him for X amount of dollars if they gave him the loan." (T. 185) Ms. Kump also makes 
similar statements in other parts of her deposition. (T. 184 and 190) 
Regarding the meeting between Ms. Kump and the Prichards, occurring on or about 
October 27,1999, at the Frontier Grill, in Roosevelt, Utah, in Agnes Prichard's Deposition, the 
following discussions occurred: 
Q. And what was the purpose of that meeting? 
A. To let us - - to read this paper and to sign it if we were willing, I 
guess. 
(T. 194) 
This deposition continues as follows: 
Q. Okay. What do you feel your signature on this document meant? 
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A. It meant to see if he could borrow money from tlie bank. 
Q. It meant to see - -
A. What if he couldn't borrow the money? What if the bank turned 
him down? Then this is not good. 
Q. What if the bank didn't turn him down, then? Then was it good? 
A. Not without earnest money down. Then I was going to get earnest 
money. 
Q. You understand that the Dunns had applied for a loan to tlie bank, 
correct? 
I 
Q. You understand that they needed this document for that - - that 
process, that bank loan application process? 
A. That's what Jean [Ms. Kump] told me. 
Q. Okay. And you understand that with this document, tlie bank, 
providing other conditions were met, could then loan tlie money to the Dunns? 
A. I do. But also, if they could borrow the money, then I would get 
earnest money and we would proceed. 
Q. Okay. If they could borrow - - you understand that if they could 
borrow tlie money, they would have had the money, correct, from the bank? 
A. It was my imderstanding, if they could borrow the money, that tiiey 
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would put down earnest money on it. 
Q. If they had the money, though, from the bank, then they wouldn't -
- they'd have all the money, correct? 
A. Well, they didn't have the money when I talked to Jean [Ms. Kump], 
because Jean was going to - - Jean was going to finance some of it. 
Q. She was going to finance, but you weren't going to finance - -
A. No. 
Q. - - any of it, correct? 
We're referring to page 1 there, on Exhibit 1 [the Contract], 
$34,500, correct? 
A. Uh-huh (Affirmative). 
Q. That's financing that you understand Jean [Ms. Kump] had agreed 
to finance? 
A. Thirty-four five? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you hadn't agreed to finance any of it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you agreed to take cash only, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. And your understanding is that if the loan went through, then all the 
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money to satisfy your requirements would have been there? 
A. No. If they could borrow the money, I would get earnest money 
first and then we would proceed with the contract. That was my understanding. 
(T.200-202) 
From these discussions in Agnes Prichard's deposition, it is clear that Ms. Prichard 
understood the contract to be binding, that it was necessary for the bank loan, and that the 
proceeds of the loan would be used for the purchase. Her argument that earnest money was still 
needed, after the bank had committed to lending, is contrary to the process. With the document, 
the bank could then feel comfortable about lending to the purchaser because the sellers were 
bound to sell to the purchaser. Agnes Prichard's argument in her deposition that earnest money 
was still required, after the bank had made its commitment, in order to bind the contract, does 
not make sense and sounds like a statement or argument thought out and plaimed in advance of 
the deposition. 
II THE TERM "N/A" SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN LIGHT OF THE 
CONTRACT DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE AND DOES NOT MAKE THE 
CONTRACT ILLUSORY 
Pilchards argue that the term "N/A" in the contract has meaning in itself, that, for 
instance, the time for closing is not applicable because there will be no closing, that the time to 
apply for a loan was not applicable because there was no intent to contract, and that earnest 
money is not applicable and thus the default provisions are not applicable either since there is 
no contract. This interpretation is contrary to the coarse of events. The Dunns needed a contract 
to obtain financing. Prichards agreed to sign the contract so that the Dunns could obtain 
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financing. Taking the contract as a whole, the terms "N/A" clearly mean there is no earnest 
money and that there is no established deadline for closing. 
17A Am. Jur. on Contracts, at Section 371, states: 
Particular words or phrases in a contract should, as a rule, be 
considered not as if in a vacuum and isolated from the context, but 
in the light of the entire contract and the intentions of the parties as 
manifested thereby. 
17A Am. Jur. on Contracts, at Section 385, states: 
It is a universal rule that a contract must be construed as a 
whole and that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from 
the entire instrument. A contract being construed is to be 
considered as a whole and the meaning gathered from the entire 
context, and not from particular words, phrases or clauses, or from 
detached or isolated portions of the contract. All the words in a 
contract are to be considered in determining its meaning, and the 
entire contract in all of its parts should be read and treated together. 
This is so because each portion of a contract is qualified by other 
portions which are relevant thereto, and has no separate existence 
apart from them. Moreover, the entire agreement is to be 
considered, to determine the meaning of each part. The rule that in 
construing an agreement, words will be given their ordinary and 
popularly accepted meaning does not prevent the consideration of 
the entire context and subject matter in the determination of the 
meaning and application of specific words and expressions. 
All clauses and provisions of the contract should if possible, 
be so construed as to harmonize with one another, and all the 
language of a contract should be construed so as to subserve, and 
not subvert, the general intention of the parties. A contract should 
be read as a whole and every part should be interpreted with 
reference to the whole, and if possible should be so interpreted as 
to give effect to its general purpose. Moreover, the whole 
agreement should if possible, be construed so as to conform to an 
evident consistent purpose. Where a contract as a whole discloses 
a given intention and certain words or clauses would, if taken 
literally, defeat the intention, they will be interpreted, if possible, 
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so as to be consistent with the general intent. The purpose declared 
in one clause cannot overcome or alter the whole contract or change 
its manifest purpose apparent from all the parts taken together.... 
Furthermore, 17A Am. Jur. on Contracts, at Section 346, states: 
It is a general principle that where a contract is fairly open 
to two constructions, by one of which it would be lawful and the 
other unlawful, the former will be adopted. Thus, if a contract is 
capable of a construction which will make it valid, legal, effective, 
and enforceable, it will be given that construction if the contract is 
ambiguous or uncertain. A construction which renders the contract 
valid is preferred to one which renders it invalid, and it will not be 
construed so as to be invalid unless that construction is required by 
the terms of the agreement in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
To follow the Prichards' interpretation is contrary to the stated purpose of the document. 
Establishing a legal precedent diat follows the Prichards' theory is contrary to public policy, is 
contrary to the rule of construction favoring the validity of contracts, and presents a high risk 
of harm to individuals with honest intentions to contract. For instance, in most cases such as 
this, application fees, credit search fees, appraisal fees, title fees and other fees would have 
already been expended by an honest purchaser by the time this contract gets to the point where, 
according to the Prichards, it is enforceable. The Prichards' argument makes it too easy to void 
contracts and too likely that individuals, intending to contract, will be unnecessarily harmed. 
Prichards' citation to the cases of Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah 1967), 
and Candlandv. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101 (Utah 1926), are directly contrary to the more recent case 
of Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), which was cited extensively in Dunns Brief in 
support of the validity of the contract in this case. 
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Prichard's citation of the case of Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 552-553 (Utah App. 
1987) for the proposition that the court is prevented from entering a reasonable time since the 
Contact in this case makes time of the essence misstates the law. Blacks Law Dictionary states 
that, "Time is the essence of contract. . . [m]eans that performance by one party at time or 
within period specified in contract is essential to enable him to require performance by other 
party." Blacks Law Dictionary 1330 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Therefore, time is of the 
essence only as to time periods specifically set forth in the contract. Where a time period is left 
blank, even though the contract makes time of the essence, a reasonable time may apply and time 
cannot be of the essence as to that provision because there is no period specified. Barker simply 
states, "Since time was not of the essence in this case, Barker need only show that he was ready, 
willing and able to perform within a reasonable time." Barker, 741 P.2d at 553. There is no 
statement by the court in Barker that courts are prevented from entering a reasonable time as to 
time periods left blank or not specified when the contract makes time of the essence. Also, the 
case ofDowntown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275,281 (Utah App. 1987), also cited by 
Prichards in their Brief, is no different than Barker, and does not provide support for Prichards 
argument, neither does the case of Griffeth v. Zumbrennen, 577 P.2d 129,131 (Utah 1978), also 
cited by Prichards in their Brief. 
On page 15, Point II, of Prichards' Brief, Prichards' claim that Dunns contend that they 
had the option to require the Prichards to sell is not supported by the trial court record, misstates 
the facts, and is contrary to Dunns' position. The Dunns have always contended that they are 
bound as well as the Prichards by the terms of the contract. 
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On page 15, Point II, and page 17, Point III, of Prichards' Brief, Prichards again misstate 
the meaning and purpose of earnest money. Earnest money is not required to bind a contract as 
argued by Dunns on pages 8 and 9 of their Appellants' Brief. See Black's Law Dictionary 456 
(5th ed. 1979); Mortenson v. Financial Growth, Inc., 456 P.2d 181 (Utah 1969); and, RHS 
Interests, Inc., v. 2721Kirby Ltd., 994 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App. 1999). 
CONCLUSION 
There is clearly an intent to contract established by the four corners of the contract itself 
and by the statements of the defendants in their depositions. The "N/A" notations in the 
contract, when construing the contract as a whole, do not destroy the enforceability of this 
contract, especially in liglit of the rule of construction which favors the enforceability of 
contracts, and in light of the related policy issues. Furthermore, the lack of earnest money does 
not destroy the enforceability of this contract. Therefore, the Dunns respectfully request that 
the District Court's Order of Dismissal which denies the Dunns' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and grants the Prichards' Motion for Summary Judgment be reversed 
Respectfully submitted this 2>f day of March, 2001. 
DANIELS. SAM 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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